WAM: Book Review

Thomas Rid’s book War and Media Operations: The US Military and the press from Vietnam to Iraq immediately caught my attention, not because it covered two conflicts in which I had been engaged as a British Media Operations Officer but because of the title ‘media operations’ deployed as it is in the US context. This was a surprise, for in all the years that I have operated alongside and indeed been embed within US military commands I had become conditioned to hearing the term Public Affairs (and Public Affairs Officers) not Media Operations. However, so the author informed me when I queried it, it would seem than the term is now gaining greater reaction amongst our US colleagues.

Rid’s book, predictably, encompasses all the major mile stones in the US military’s relationship with the media. Vietnam is used as a starting point in his discussion and is covered in great detail, with the well known and usual discussion points of Lyndon B Johnsons decision not to run again, of Walter Cronkite’s assessment of the war, the effect on public opinion of the imagery of Phan Thi Kim Phuc running from a Napalm attack and the generally combative nature of the relationship between the US military and the media. Rid’s examination of the invasion of Grenada and Panama is fresher and generally more interesting although the latter might usefully have considered the rather unique presentational problems that were caused by the US invasion of a UK Commonwealth nation and the barrage of public criticism that the US received from the unexpected quarter of the UK media. Panama is also usefully covered as is, in brief, Somalia and the Balkans. The section on Afghanistan is interesting with some new and original material - as befits the impressive list of interviewees at the Appendix - although it would have been useful for some greater contemplation of the effects of the invasion on audiences in the Arab and Muslim world and the steps that the coalition took (or did not!) to ameliorate the generally poor press that the operations were receiving.

After his hard edged examples, Rid uses Chapter 7 to develop into some of the doctrinal and organisational issues associated with the media management process, he relies heavily on various US DoD publications - always a challenge to wade through for any commentator on the subject. Some publications have been superseded prior to the publication of the book although this would not have altered Rid’s argument in any substantive manner. Chapter 8 considers in depth the 2003 War in Iraq although again there is little new information. Nevertheless his points are well made.

All of Rid’s material thus far is well researched and presented although at times is perhaps slightly pedestrian for the more experienced reader in this area. However what is particularly refreshing about this book are the opening chapters where Rid considers how militaries learn lessons and the need for strategic innovation. In the context of media operations this makes his book extremely timely – particularly for any reader that has an interest in mapping across from the US model to the current media operations practices in the UK MoD. Rid carefully considers the difficulties associated with making innovative changes in complex hierarchal structures such as the DoD; he does so from a number of useful perspectives: from those of senior officers, from mid and junior level officers and from civilians working within DoD. Interestingly he believes that ‘there are good reasons to assume that the most useful ideas for improvement come from lower levels’ – an assertion with which I whole heartily agree. Indeed it is in this, the subsequent chapter on strategic innovation and in his conclusions that Rid’s book scores highest. I enjoyed this book and commend it to anyone with an interest in the military – media relationship. If there is one criticism it is again that title – Media Operations. If the US is now moving away from Public Affairs to the more edgy Media Operations it would have been useful to learn why. Nevertheless it is a minor point in an otherwise useful publication – particularly for his insights in to problems of military innovation and learning.

Review by Steve Tatham.