WAM: Book Review

As the title suggests, this book takes a critical view of the coalition's failure to effectively co-ordinate and execute a detailed plan to embrace the burgeoning and influential pan-Arab media, and in particular Al Jazeera, during the Iraq invasion in 2003. The author's own role in the media operations for the Royal Navy during Operation Telic (known as Operation Iraqi Freedom in the United States) ensures an illuminating insider's appraisal of the main inadequacies of the coalition approach, primarily their failure to secure local support for the coalition's justifications for war, its assumed urgency, or for the forces on the ground.

Tatham's insights are especially perceptive when commenting on the immediate context of coalition media operations and its subsequent limitations. By conducting exhaustive research and elite interviews, the author constructs a comprehensive picture of the strategic preparations made by the coalition in the run-up to and realisation of the invasion in early 2003. Whilst initially pointing out the 'anachronistic' (87) and under-resourced approach of the British contingent, the major criticisms are reserved for the efforts of the US in their relationship with Arab media. The overall emphasis is arguably on the contrast between the two members of the coalition, though he finds both guilty of mistakes: firstly, in their judgement of the significance of the emergent Arab satellite channels and, secondly, in the marginalisation and distrust of Arab reporters by senior officers on the ground.

The major deficiencies of the coalition strategy are firmly placed at the door of the Bush administration, starting with the disregard of sympathetic public opinion in the region following the 9/11 attacks, especially through Bush's use of 'with us or against us' rhetoric and the link made between 9/11 and Saddam Hussein's regime. Furthermore, the promulgation of the preceding claims by the administration to legitimise the doctrine of pre-emption and ultimately an attack on Iraq.

Despite lessons supposedly learnt in Afghanistan, Tatham uncovers a surprising lack of co-ordination between the British and US media operations, not only in overall strategy but also in the presentation of information to the press (102). Whilst US and British alike are shown to be guilty of excluding the very journalists whose influence they could benefit from, the US goes even further in demonising Al Jazeera, some right-wingers calling it 'Bin Laden's station' (90), rather than embracing the channel that offers the closest thing to an 'independent media organisation' the Arab world has ever seen (202).

General military distrust of the media was put to the test in Iraq, with the large-scale US scheme for embedding reporters with military units. The resulting effect on war journalism is not a major issue of this book, though Tatham is concerned with the marginalisation of correspondents from Arab media. Despite some early efforts, Arab reporters embedded with the US military soon felt excluded from any meaningful partnership, as officers refused to brief international reporters who did not herald from the more compliant US media outlets. Tatham posits that the failure to give priority to the local Arab media in the embedding process, and the absence of effective monitoring of Arab media output by the US military, fostered misunderstanding and unease. These failings are contrasted with British officers, such as Chris Vernon, who make more of an effort to include Arab journalists. However, it was only with the appointment of an ex-British Army embedded reporter, Alex Gardiner, that Abu Dhabi TV secured access to substantial briefings (144) - hardly an indication of British trust. At least the British did monitor Arab media via a Foreign Office unit headed by Gerard Russell, and so had more than anecdotal ideas about local media content (95).

Tatham provides a useful overview of the main pan-Arab media organisations, including their funding status, and lists the most influential as Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya and Abu Dhabi TV (8). Of the above outlets, Al Jazeera receives the most attention, due to its popularity and perceived influence in the region. There is no attempt at detailed 'media influence' analysis of the dynamics between Arab media and public opinion, though various commentators offer views on whether Al Jazeera is leading public opinion or slavishly following it (193-201). The shortcomings of the Arab media, such as sensationalism or opinionated reporting, are considered alongside the biased outlook of US news providers such as Fox News.

My criticisms are as follows. Firstly, there are some obvious mistakes which should have been amended in editing - the US presidential election appears in 1993 instead of 1992 (32), the fall of the Saddam Statue in Firdous Square should have been corrected from 10 April to 9 April (136), and there is inconsistency in spelling of the Iraqi Information Minister's name 'Al Sahaf' (180)/ 'Al-Sahhaf' (177). Secondly, Chapter Four is only six pages long. It makes the crucial point about the lack of Arab media during the earlier Gulf War, but there are some repetitive points and other observations that perhaps could have been included in the preceding chapter. Thirdly, and this is more of an overall substantive point, the criticisms made about the US administration are warranted, but this leaves questions about British failures relatively under-examined. Potential case studies that could have benefited from insider scrutiny include the purported 'Basra uprising' or the various captures of Umm Qasr. Tatham appears at times to be keen to stress successes such as the Sir Galahad aid delivery (122) or Radio Chatham (163) without the scepticism reserved for the US. This is understandable, perhaps, given his own close involvement, and the author certainly does not conceal his own role or profess to be unaligned.

As well as offering advice to Arab channels, citing the Abu Dhabi appointment of ex-British Army officer Alex Gardiner as an example to emulate (149), Tatham is more concerned with how coalition members can improve their fragile relationship with Arab media. The author asserts that Al Jazeera in particular is a credible channel and one that the US administration cannot risk not engaging with (201). Former CENTCOM commander, General Anthony Zinni apparently confesses, 'our whole public relations effort out there has been a disaster' (204), though one has to wonder if the invasion of Iraq could ever have been 'spun' in such a way as to convince Arab opinion of its merits without more serious adjustments to the military intervention itself, in addition to post-invasion planning and reconstruction. It is not only about 'an arrogance' (203) in failing to get the justifications and messages across, but an arrogance, in my opinion, demonstrated by the coalition's determined rush to invade without UN backing, or the political will to provide security for the Iraqi people once the regime had been defeated. However, Tatham's objective is not primarily to examine the legitimacy of arguments for war presented by the coalition, but to provide an account of the coalition's media operations in Iraq, and in this task he is successful, producing a record of recent historical events which is revealing, informative and engaging.

Katy Parry
Liverpool University